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IDENTIFICATION FORM

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OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (CIA)

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

- 1. \* Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.

Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.

1 - 15 March 1962

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U. S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant.

To collect intelligence.

- 2. 3 third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana.

To collect intelligence.

- 3. 2 third-country trained intelligence officers, readied to travel in Cuba for temporary periods.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.



1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY

4. \* Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.

PURPOSE

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

5. \* Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

OTHER OPERATIONS

6. \* Continue negotiating for British help in contaminating locomotive lubricants.

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

7. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

16 - 31 March 1962

CONSIDERATIONS

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

British assistance is required to undertake a successful sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking down, once the contaminant is introduced.

One team of [ ] and [ ] team of [ ] agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

ACTIVITY

- 8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.
- 9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.

PURPOSE

- To collect intelligence.
- To ready agent operations.

- 10. \* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

- 11. \* Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

CONSIDERATIONS

Possible future use in communications and support.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. ~~Center is being activated in Spain.~~ Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in Mexico City, Caracas, and Aruba. San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago, Chile, are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

*= delete as in red ink lines*

16, 11  
6(1)(c)  
+ (4)  
11, 12

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.



~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

1 - 15 April 1962

CONSIDERATIONS

PURPOSE

ACTIVITY

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Number of agents undetermined as yet.

12. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.
13. 5 third-country agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 30 April 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

Possible use for communications and support.

- To collect intelligence.
- To collect intelligence.

14. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.
15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

1 - 15 May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

- To collect intelligence.
- To collect intelligence.

16. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.
17. 3 legal resident agents in Cuba.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.



1 - 15 May 1962 (cont)

CONSIDERATIONS

PURPOSE

ACTIVITY

To collect intelligence.

18. One or possibly two trained staff intelligence officers (non-U.S.) resident in Havana.

To collect intelligence.

19. Ten legal travellers in Cuba.

["Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods.]

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 31 May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can.

To collect intelligence.

Difficult

CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable.

To collect intelligence.

21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines.

22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba.

To ready agent operations.

24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962



ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

OTHER OPERATIONS

25. By 31 May, develop a plan for counterfeiting currency, which would not be implemented until a decision was made to debase the economy in Cuba.

To debase the economy of Cuba.

A counterfeiting program is being developed. Needs are to staff the proposal thoroughly to permit a policy decision to be made and to staff out a feasible distribution plan. It is expected that no decision to implement such a plan would be made immediately.

1 June - 31 July 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. \* 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba.

To reinforce and resupply, as possible.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents.

To ready agent operations.

29. \* Collection of psychological material.

To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.

This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere.

30. \* Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers.

To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

31. \* By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime.

To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.

This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials "in place."

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962



1 June - 31 July 1962 (cont)

CONSIDERATIONS

PURPOSE

End of July 1962

ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S. military intervention.

To provide the Special Group (USC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

- 32. \* Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (State)

ACTIVITY

1. Make political decision to intervene with U.S. military forces in Cuba.

2. U.S. officials and news releases on policy decision.

3. Latin American leaders, government and public, in support.

PURPOSE

To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.S. to become involved in assuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution; this involvement must include the commitment of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.

Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.

Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessed in the perspective of world opinion and U. S. security interests.

Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.

Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (Defense)

ACTIVITY

1. After political decision, provide maximum U.S. support to resistance fighters in Cuba who have been spotted in Phase I.
2. After political decision, commit U.S. military forces in accordance with contingency plans.

PURPOSE

To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Communist regime's military and police forces; as part of the assurance, the U.S. support must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.

To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.

CONSIDERATIONS

DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of equipment and personnel for commitment must be developed with maximum lead time. Close coordination with CIA is required to insure maximum readiness to meet the immediate needs of the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility in preparing for these support activities makes security a paramount consideration.

Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness to accomplish the assigned mission. The military forces must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (CIA)

ACTIVITY

1. Support U. S. military actions in Cuba.

PURPOSE

To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U. S. military operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed and considered in the development of military planning. Executive responsibility for directing the use of covert assets must be clearly understood as resting in the U. S. military commander of the U. S. intervention, as in agreed-upon wartime operations.



~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE II (USIA)

ACTIVITY

1. Increase news emphasis on Cuban revolt and intervention from the outside to help the Cuban movement.

PURPOSE

To neutralize opposition to U. S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U. S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

CONSIDERATIONS

Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (State)

March - July 1962

ACTIVITY

Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.

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# OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE I (Defense)

March - July 1962

## ACTIVITY

Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.

2. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.

3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U. S. military capability for intervention.

## PURPOSE

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To add to the U. S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.

## CONSIDERATIONS

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visibility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U. S. military manpower and equipment.

The U. S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures is reduced to a minimum.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~



OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (USIA)

ACTIVITY

Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new materials for use as the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.



\*Teams = 2 to 5 bodies

~~T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T~~

	<u>TEAMS*</u> <u>INFILTRATED</u>	<u>3RD COUNTRY</u> <u>RES. AGENTS</u>	<u>3RD COUNTRY</u> <u>STAFF IO'S</u>	<u>LEGAL</u> <u>TRAVELERS</u>	<u>AGENTS</u> <u>SELECTED</u>	<u>AGENTS</u> <u>TRAINED</u>
31 May 1962	13	10+5 temp. Leg. Travls.	51n/2ready	30-5 temp.	155	85
31 July 1962	23 to 28	15	7	25	255	155
30 Sept. 1962	28 to 33	20	7	35	255	155
30 Nov. 1962	33 to 38	20	7	40	255	155
28 Feb. 1963	48 to 53	30	9	50	255	155

*Also  
Skey*

~~T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T~~



\*Teams = 2 to 5 bodies

~~T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T~~

	<u>TEAMS*</u> <u>INFILTRATED</u>	<u>3RD COUNTRY</u> <u>RES. AGENTS</u>	<u>3RD COUNTRY</u> <u>STAFF</u> <u>IO'S</u>	<u>LEGAL</u> <u>TRAVELERS</u>	<u>AGENTS</u> <u>SELECTED</u>	<u>AGENTS</u> <u>TRAINED</u>
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28 Feb. 1963	48 to 53	30	9	50	255	155

*1360  
5 key*

~~T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T~~